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Belief revision is understood here as the process of revising a consistent theory K with respect to a contingent sentence A that is inconsistent with K. It is assumed that a rational agent would have a method for obtaining a unique result. That method would be encoded by a revision-function *. which would depend on the agent in question. The result of such revision is denoted as K * A.
There are two other theory-change operations to note besides that of revision:
these are the operations of expansion and of contraction. Intuitively, one expands one's belief-set K with respect to A by adding A to K (and then taking the logical closure of the result). So the expansion K + A (of K with respect to A) is [K. A] .
Here, moreover, we assume that A is consistent with K. In order to contract K with respect to A?that is. to get rid of A?it can be assumed that A is already in K. and is not itself a logical truth (for we do not wish ever to get rid of any of those). The contraction (of K with respect to A) is denoted as K ? A.
In order to revise K with respect A?that is. to adopt the new beliefs even though it conflicts with one's current beliefs K?it may be assumed that A is not itself a logical falsehood, but is inconsistent with K. If. however. A is consistent with one's present belief-set K. then the operation of adopting A as a new belief is simply that of expanding K with respect to A: 'revision' would, in such circumstances, be a misnomer. It is important to note, for the purposes of assessing the significance of the results in this paper, that the pre-formal notions of minimal mutilation and minimal bloating can remain unanalyzed. No formal explication of these pre-formal notions is called for. We do not need to take any stand on the question whether these pre-formal notions admit of any satisfactory formal explication at all. Nor need we take any view as to which of any two competing explications might be the better one. The results below enjoy their significance independently of any answer to such questions. This is because the results can be framed in terms of the pre-formal notions.
At the appropriate juncture below, when the dialectical setting is clearer, we shall re-visit the foregoing point in order to emphasize it. To foreshadow: what this paper shows is how to accommodate, in a revision-function satisfying all the so called AGM postulates for revision (for which, see ?2 below), both bloatings and mutilations of any kind that the reader might have in mind?not just those muti lations produced by full-meet revisions or those bloatings produced by maxichoice revisions (for which, see ?1.2 below). To make matters worse: the bizarre revisions that the AGM postulates admit can combine both extreme mutilation and extreme bloating (however the reader wishes to construe these). And to make matters even worse:
such bizarre revisions can take place, as it were, 'infinitely-where'.
1.2. Historical background. The AGM literature to date reveals the possibility of only two special cases of degeneracy. Moreover, these possibilities have so far been revealed to exist only in isolation, rather than in combination. Let us assume, in order to explain these two cases, that K is ripe for revision with respect to A.
Alchourr?n and Makinson [1982] made the following two observations. First, every maxichoice revision of K with respect to A is a complete theory.2 Hence, for incomplete theories K and contingent sentences A of minor consequence, maxi choice revisions of K with respect to A will be (maximally) bloating. Secondly, the full meet revision of any theory K with respect to A is just [A] itself.3 Hence, for non-trivial K and incomplete [A] , the full meet revision of K with respect to A will be (maximally) mutilating.
The first of these points was reiterated by Alchourr?n, G?rdenfors and Makinson [1985] . at p. 511, and was used to motivate the introduction of the notion of partial meet contractions and their associated revisions. Immediately after raising the problem that maxichoice revisions are complete, they wrote as follows:4
The "inflation properties" that ensue from applying the maxichoice op erations bring out the interest of looking at other formal operations that yield smaller sets as values. In this paper, we will start out from the assumption that there is a selection function y that picks out a class of the "most important" maximal subsets of K that fail to imply A. The contraction K?A is then defined as the intersection of all the maximal subsets selected by y. Functions defined in this way will be called partial meet contraction functions, and their corresponding revision functions will be called partial meet revision functions. So: in the case of the contraction of K with respect to A. meets would be taken of some several, but not necessarily all. maximally non-(A-implying) subsets of K. This was clearly intended to avoid both maxichoice contraction (where a single such subset of K would be taken, so the meet would be degenerate) and full meet contraction (where all such subsets of K would be taken, and the meet would accordingly be inclusion-minimal). Although in the above quote we see motivating mention only of the problem of bloating ('inflation') posed by maxichoice revisions, it is clear that the authors desired also to avoid the problem of mutilation posed by full meet revision. It is also evident that the move to partial meet revisions was being thought of as a way of avoiding the respective kinds of degeneracy at the two extremes. Recall Given their professed motivation, it is significant that they did not raise or address the worry that either kind of degeneracy (the bloating inflicted by maxichoice revisions, or the mutilation inflicted by the full meet revision) might persist with infinitely many choices of non-empty subsets of (K _L ->A) that could be used to construct partial meet revisions of K with respect to A. They did not anticipate that the two kinds of degeneracy might arise for partial meet revisions, either in isolation or?which would be even worse?in combination. The operational assumption that the reader would be justified in imputing to them was that the maxichoice and full meet cases could be viewed as lying at opposite ends of what could now be presumed to be a spectrum with a reasonable 'middle range' throughout, so to speak. That was the spectrum of (transitively relational) partial-meet contraction-functions.
The corresponding revision-functions would then be obtained via the Levi identity As evidence for the quietist view that this reading attributes to ^GM-theory. note that G?rdenfors [1988] claimed (at p. 82) that because the basic and supplementary /4GM-postulates for contraction had been 'independently motivated', the partial meet representation theorem for the contraction postulates gives us a strong reason to focus on transitively relational partial meet contraction functions as an ideal representation of the intuitive process of contraction. [Emphasis added.] Likewise, then, the corresponding partial meet representation theorem for the re vision postulates should (by straightforward adaptation of the foregoing quote) ' [give] us a strong reason to focus on transitively relational partial meet [revision] functions as an ideal representation of the intuitive process of [revision] .' The thought seemed to be. therefore, that by avoiding the two extremes and stick ing to the middle range, the postulates would now permit only rationally admissible revisions to take place, and the choice among the various competing belief-revision functions in this middle range would be a largely pragmatic matter, depending on varying preferences among rational agents. If this were not the thought, then it is inexplicable how potential worries about both bloating and mutilation, as legiti mately provoked by maxichoice revision and full-meet revision respectively, did not continue to be explicitly and actively entertained by ^GM-theorists with regard to partial-meet revisions in the newly provided middle range. Instead, it appeared to be an article of faith that partial meet revisions of K with respect to A that were constructed in this middle range by means of non-empty, proper, subsets of (K _L ^A) would avoid the two extremes and their respective kinds of degeneracy.
They would involve neither mutilation nor bloating. Such was the reassurance that the method of partial meets seemed to provide. The results of this paper show that even the middle range is fraught, in infinitely many places, with degeneracy. Completely bizarre revisions are permitted through out this middle range. We prove a result of the form 'any kind of bizarre-looking revision is sanctioned by the full set of AGM postulates'. One can say to the reader, in effect: 'Choose any bizarre revisions you like, by whatever criteria of bizarreness you care to employ; they can be yielded by a revision function that satisfies all the AGM postulates, both basic and supplementary' Note that maxichoice revisions can be bloating (but no one claimed they were mutilating); and full meet revisions can be mutilating (and certainly they are not bloating). So it is worth emphasizing here that when the reader is invited, as just described, to choose any bizarre revisions she likes, the present author means that she may choose (individual) revisions that are both bloating and mutilating.
Nothing like this has hitherto been anticipated by AGM theorists. If it had been anticipated?let alone proved?then there should have been considerable con sternation about the adequacy of the AGM postulates as an account of rational belief-revision. For the problem is not just that one can find some revision func tions (satisfying the postulates) that are bloating and that one can find yet other revision functions (satisfying the postulates) that are mutilating. The problem is much worse than this!?one can find revision functions (satisfying the postulates) that are both bloating and mutilating. The text quoted above from Alchourr?n.
G?rdenfors, and Makinson [1985] continues as follows:
It will be shown that they [partial meet contraction and revision functions
?NT] satisfy G?rdenfors' postulates, and indeed provide a representa tion theorem for those postulates. When constrained in suitable ways, by relations or. more restrictedly. by transitive relations, they also satisfy his "supplementary postulates", and provide another representation theo rem for the entire collection of "basic" plus "supplementary" postulates.
The results to be presented below reveal the 'entire collection of "basic" plus "sup plementary" postulates' for belief-revision functions to be surprisingly lax. Whether this degree of laxity is acceptable (on the part of a theory aspiring to characterize rational belief-revision) is a more philosophical and methodological question into which we do not, in this paper, inquire. Our concerns here are purely logical.
The upshot of our investigations might be put this way: what the celebrated representation theorem was supposed to establish was a conceptual bridge between a postulationally constrained notion and a mathematically constructed one. But all that this representation theorem shows is that a totally inadequately constrained notion of revision implicitly defined by the chosen postulates is matched by a totally inadequately constrained notion of revision constructed by means of partial meets. employed here is in order. The proofs below focus on the deducibility relation. But they exploit only rather weak properties of that relation. In particular, our results would apply to an object-language whose logic was intuitionistic. All the results could be given algebraic proofs instead, by means of 'semantic diagrams', interpreting theories as sets of possible worlds. The latter method, however, can easily commit one to a classical logic for the object-language, unless one is extremely circumspect. (Moreover, the author has written out the algebraic proofs for all the results of this paper, only to find that there is no significant reduction to be had in the overall length of proofs.) It is desirable to have an account of theory-revision that would deal with intu itionistic theories as well as classical ones.3 To be sure, there are occasional points at which we apply constructive dilemma or classical reductio in our reasoning. But that is a use of classical logic in the metalanguage, not the object-language. More over, such uses of classical reasoning in the metalanguage are applied to statements of deducibility in the object-language. So these uses would actually be acceptable to the intuitionist provided that the deducibility relation in the object-language was decidable?which of course is the case for both intuitionistic and classical proposi tional logic. The meta-reasoning is therefore strictly classical only in the case where the logic of the object-language is undecidable (such as would be the case with in tuitionistic first-order logic with at least two monadic predicates, and with classical first-order logic with at least one dyadic predicate). By focusing on deducibility, however, rather than using semantic diagrams, we obtain results with the ready assurance that they are applicable not only to classically closed theories, but also to theories closed under intuitionistic. even if not classical, logic.
?2. The A GTVf-theory of revision. 2.1. The basic postulates for revision. We focus in this paper on the operation of revision, bearing in mind that revision is intrinsically related to the other two operations of expansion and contraction.
The y4GM-postulates governing belief-revision functions can be found in Al chourr?n. G?rdenfors and Makinson [1985] at pp. 513 and 515. and (in slightly altered form) in G?rdenfors [1988] . pp. 54-56. For definiteness. we focus on the earlier paper. It lays down six 'basic' postulates (K*1)-(K*6).
For present pur poses, we may assume without loss of generality that K is ripe for revision with respect to A (this being the principal case of theoretical interest).
(K*l) K * A is always a theory.
(K*2) A\s'mK*A. It is well known that the supplementary postulates do not rule out the possibility of the 'amnesiac' revision, whereby K * A is simply taken to be [A] .1 So the supplementary postulates certainly do not speak to the problem of mutilation.
It may be suggested, however, that the supplementary postulates were intended, at least in part, to avert or at least to mitigate the unwelcome prospect of unnec essary bloatings by revision-functions.8 But such a suggestion would be in error. The present paper shows that the supplementary postulates cannot fulfil such an 6This was first shown in Makinson [1987] . 7This result is due to Mark Ryan [1996] . See footnote 9 for more relevant information in light of our generalization of Ryan's result by means of Theorem 3 below. 8Such a suggestion would flow naturally from the quotation above from p. 82 of G?rdenfors [1988] . See also G?rdenfors [1982] . at p. 142. where, in discussing the supplementary postulates for revision, he clearly sees those postulates as seeking to ensure that K * (A A B) is 'the minimal change of K necessary to include both A and B\ [Emphasis added.] intention. As its title implies, it furnishes a crescendo of degeneracy results (Theo rems 3. 4 and 5 below) for the full ^4GM-theory of belief-revision, supplementary
postulates included. The result shows that the full set of postulates for the AGM theory of rational belief-revision is so lax that revisions as irrational as can be imagined?both maximally mutilating and maximally bloating?can be delivered by revision-functions satisfying the full set. The definition of K * A as A 0 (which is defined without reference to K) makes the deviant revision-function amnesiac about K in a similar way.
Theorem 3 affords a uniform way of making potentially bizarre revisions. Note that 0 is an arbitrary consistent set of sentences. For many a theory K ripe for revision with respect to A. the theory A 0 will be bizarre as a revision of K with respect to A. This holds even (indeed, especially) when A is consistent with ?. so that A ? is [A. ?] . For then ? will often effect unwanted bloating in addition to unwanted mutilation. This problem of bloating is particularly acute when ? is a complete theory, or when ? has no extra-logical vocabulary (that is. propositional atoms: or names, function signs and predicates) in common with K or with A.
If this were not already bad enough for the ^(GM-theory of revision, it is worth pointing out also that one can appeal to Theorem 3 so as to ensure that, for any given K ripe for revision with respect to A. and for any theory J that would definitely count as bizarre qua revision of K with respect to A. there will be an y4GM-revision function * such that K * A = J. The way to ensure this will be described presently (see Theorem 4 below), after the following two Frobenian definitions. 9It was pointed out in Alchourr?n and Makinson [1982] that 'full-meet revision1 (as it subsequently came to be called) is this amnesiac revision operation. See their Observation 2.2 on p. 19. The empty-set special case of Observation 7 of the present paper, however, is a stronger result, and was first shown by Ryan [1996] . See his Proposition 2. p. 132. Proof. Let a spectrum be given as described. Choose an arbitrary index i < y. Let j < y be an arbitrary index. We proceed by constructive dilemma. Substituting on the right of this by means of the last identity we obtain Hi\-Di.Uj<y{Dj->Hj). H Lemma 16. For any spectrum ({Z)/}/<;i. {//,-}, <-;). where y < co. and for every i < y.
Hi=Di-UJ<y(Dj^Hj).
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 14 and 15. H Definition 10. Given a consistent theory K, a 7^-spectrum is a spectrum ({Df }z<>,, {Hf}i<y) (for some y < co), where, as indicated by the superscripts, the choice of the ith member of each list depends on K, and for every i < y. K refutes Df (so that K is ripe for revision with respect to Df).
Such a spectrum is somewhere [resp., everywhere] bizarre just in case for some [resp. every] i < y, the theory Hf would count as a bizarre revision of K with respect to Df.
Example of a TT-spectrum. Let K contain -^3xy/x (for some consistent predicate (//). For Df take the sentence 'there are exactly / t//s\ and let Hf be any consistent theory containing Df. theory jf (subject only to the condition that Jf be consistent with Df) and take [Jf ,Df] as the revision of K with respect to Df. Proof. For every n > 0, K refutes 'there are exactly n non-^/s' (=Df), so K is ripe for revision with respect to the same. The proof proceeds from here exactly as did the proof for Corollary 1. Y With both these Corollaries, the bizarre extra beliefs Jf could, for example, differ in saying, among other things, that at any given time there are exactly n angels dancing on the head of a pin. Corollary 2 shows that the full set of eight AGM postulates for revision admits of revision functions * such that for every theory K containing a universal gener alzation, and for infinitely many A with respect to which K is ripe for revision, the revision K * A can be as bizarre as one wishes.
At this juncture we reprise the point made at the end of ? 1.1. Note that Theorem 5 and its two Corollaries do not presuppose, or depend on. any particular analysis or formal explication of the notions of (minimal) mutilation or (minimal) bloating?or of bizarreness (qua revision). The dialectical structure of the predicament in which A GM-theory is revealed to stand is as follows. ?4. Concluding remarks. In light of the foregoing results it would appear that an undesirable degree of laxity has been revealed in the full set of ^GM-postulates for revision-functions. This laxity has been revealed by attention to the postu lates themselves, rather than to the mathematical constructions afforded by the representation theorem.
4.1. Bizarre revisions as partial meet revisions. Naturally, because of the rep resentation theorem about partial meet revisions, the question arises how one is to understand the possibility of these bizarre revisions in terms of partial meets.
Daniel Osherson [2005] has provided a straightforward answer. The following ac count is for the case where one is concerned to satisfy only the basic postulates, and yet achieve a bizarre revision. (Note, however, that the account applies only to revisions that are closed under classical logic.) Theorem 6. Suppose the theory K is ripe for revision with respect to A. Let J be any classically closed theory implying A. Then J is a partial meet revision of K with
